It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says a person may volunteer to bring a provisional guilt offering every day. Therefore, we say to the second person: Volunteer and bring a provisional guilt offering, to prevent the first individual from bringing an unwarranted sin offering. And he should stipulate: If the first person ate the piece of permitted fat, that means that he himself ate the forbidden fat and consequently the offering should be an atonement for his own transgression. And if not, i.e., if the first person ate the forbidden fat and he himself committed no transgression, let it be a gift offering.

The Sages taught in a baraita: A person unwittingly ate a piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was subsequently informed of its questionable status. He then unwittingly ate another piece of fat about which it was uncertain whether it was forbidden fat or permitted fat, and he was again informed of its questionable status. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that just as he would be liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one if he was later informed that they were all pieces of forbidden fat, so too, in these cases of uncertainty he must bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda; Rabbi Elazar; and Rabbi Shimon all say: He is obligated to bring only one provisional guilt offering, as it is stated: ''And the priest shall make atonement for him concerning the unwitting error which he committed unwittingly and he shall be forgiven'' (Leviticus 5:18). It is derived from the verse’s double mention of his unwitting status, for which he is liable to bring one offering, that a person is obligated to bring only one offering even for many unwitting sins, despite the fact that he was informed of the uncertainty in between each instance of consumption.

With regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement in the baraita, Rabbi Zeira says: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught a principle with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for several unwitting transgressions: Knowledge of the questionable status of an uncertain case prior to each subsequent transgression divides them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings when one later learns that he definitely committed unwitting transgressions. In the case of the baraita, as he was informed prior to each instance of consumption of the uncertain status of the fat he ate before his subsequent consumption of uncertain fat, he is obligated to bring a sin offering for each instance of consumption if he later discovers he actually sinned.

Rava says: Knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression does not divide them into obligations to bring multiple sin offerings. Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of consumption that the piece he ate was prohibited before eating each subsequent piece he would have been liable to bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had knowledge of the uncertain status of the piece he ate before eating each subsequent piece, he is obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. According to Rava, uncertain knowledge does not divide the unwitting transgressions to the extent that one is obligated to bring multiple sin offerings. Only definite knowledge renders one liable to bring multiple sin offerings.

Abaye said to Rava: And you? Do you not hold that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression divides them with regard to the obligation to bring sin offerings for each one? As, if it enters your mind to say that knowledge of uncertainty prior to committing each transgression does not divide them with regard to multiple sin offerings, and therefore one brings only one sin offering, why does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rule that he brings a provisional guilt offering for each and every one, when he had knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption?

After all, isn’t it taught in a baraita: The principle with regard to the matter is as follows: In any case where separate transgressions are divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple sin offerings, they are also considered divided for the purpose of determining liability to bring multiple provisional guilt offerings in cases of uncertainty. If one does not bring several sin offerings in a case of definite transgression, he is not obligated to bring several provisional guilt offerings in a case of uncertainty either.

Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: And according to you, that you said knowledge of uncertainty prior to each transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, if that is so, what would you say about the following case: Someone ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat before Yom Kippur and another olive-bulk of forbidden fat after Yom Kippur. Since Yom Kippur itself stands in place of a provisional guilt offering, i.e., it atones for any prior uncertain transgression, if he later learned that both pieces were in fact forbidden fat, would you say that so too, Yom Kippur divides the two actions and that he is obligated to bring two sin offerings?

But this cannot be correct, as he ate both of them in a single lapse of awareness and there was no knowledge of sin to divide them. Rather, it stands to reason that like Yom Kippur, knowledge of uncertainty does not divide transgressions into multiple sin offering obligations. Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: That case in which Yom Kippur occurred in between transgressions is not comparable to having knowledge of uncertainty between each transgression. Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur atones for sins that were unknown to him? Perhaps it atones only for sins that were known to him. Rava said to him in reply: We learned this explicitly in a mishna (Shevuot 2b): Yom Kippur atones for sins whether one became aware of them before Yom Kippur or did not become aware of them.

The Gemara cites another version of the difficulty raised against Abaye’s opinion: Some say that Rava bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: Since Yom Kippur serves to divide the two acts of consumption into two obligations, similar to knowledge of the questionable status of fat according to Abaye, what is the halakha in the following case: If one ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat on the morning of Yom Kippur and an olive-bulk of forbidden fat in the afternoon of Yom Kippur, so too would he be obligated to bring two sin offerings? This cannot be correct, as both olive-bulks were consumed in a single lapse of awareness.

Abaye said to Rava bar Ḥanan: Who shall say to us that Yom Kippur provides atonement at every hour of the day? Perhaps the entire day as a single unit serves to provide atonement only when it begins, in the evening? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to him: Fool [terada]! It is taught in a mishna (25a): With regard to one who encountered uncertainty concerning whether he performed a sin on Yom Kippur, even if it was at nightfall at the end of the day, he is exempt, as the entire day atones for uncertain sins.

Rav Idi bar Avin raises another objection to Abaye’s opinion from a mishna (Yoma 81a): If one ate and drank unwittingly on Yom Kippur in one lapse of awareness, e.g., he forgot it was Yom Kippur, he is liable to bring only one sin offering. But according to Abaye he should be liable to bring two sin offerings, as between the eating and the drinking it is impossible that there was no interval of even a minimal amount of time during the day. That interval of time would allow him to gain knowledge of the possible transgression, and therefore it should serve to atone for him, as Yom Kippur stands in place of a provisional guilt offering. And yet it is taught in the mishna: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

Rav Idi bar Avin concludes his objection: And if it enters your mind that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each possible transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings for each one, this lapse of time on Yom Kippur should serve to divide his two transgressions and therefore he should be liable to bring two sin offerings. The Sages say in response: When Rabbi Zeira said that knowledge of uncertainty prior to each unwitting transgression divides them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings, he was clarifying the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. By contrast, this mishna, which indicates that the passage of time on Yom Kippur does not divide transgressions into obligations for separate sin offerings, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

The Gemara objects: But from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it follows that the first clause is also in accordance with his opinion. This is significant, as that same mishna later teaches (Yoma 81a): If on Yom Kippur one drank the salty liquid in which fish are pickled, or fish brine [morayes], he is exempt. One can infer: But if he drank vinegar he is liable.

And who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: Vinegar does not revive the spirit, i.e., it does not have the status of a beverage, and therefore one who drinks it on Yom Kippur is exempt. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I say that vinegar does revive the spirit and is therefore considered like a beverage. And from the fact that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the first clause must also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Sages say in response: That is not necessarily so, as one can say the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi whereas the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

Rava raised another objection to Abaye from a baraita: One is obligated to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property only if he derived benefit of at least the value of one peruta from the property. If one unwittingly ate from consecrated property today and ate again tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from consecrated property today and again derived benefit tomorrow, or if he ate from the property today and derived benefit from it tomorrow, or if he derived benefit from it today and ate from it tomorrow, even if the time between them was as long as from now until three years later, from where is it derived that they combine with each other to amount to one peruta-worth of benefit and thereby render him obligated to bring a guilt offering?

The baraita answers that the verse states: ''If anyone commits a misuse [tim’ol ma’al]'' (Leviticus 5:15). The double verb [tim’ol ma’al] extended the obligation to bring a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property to a case where the value of individual instances of misuse at different times amount to a total of one peruta. Rava concludes his objection: But why should that be the halakha according to Abaye, who maintains that knowledge of uncertainty, and similarly the day of Yom Kippur, which has the same effect as a provisional guilt offering, divides his actions into separate entities? When the second misuse occurs after Yom Kippur, isn’t his sin atoned for by Yom Kippur? Since his acts of possible transgression are divided, how can they combine to the value of one peruta?

The Sages say in response: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? Only with regard to ritual prohibitions. But it does not atone with regard to monetary matters. Misuse of consecrated property entails a monetary obligation to restore the value of the principal with the addition of one-fifth. Since Yom Kippur does not exempt one from the monetary obligation entailed by a sin, the two acts of misuse combine to render one obligated to bring a guilt offering.

The Gemara suggests another answer. If you wish, say instead: When does Yom Kippur atone for sins? It atones for sins only if they were committed in their full measure, but it does not atone for sins that one transgressed only by half of their full measure. Consequently, Yom Kippur does not atone for misuse of consecrated property of the value of less than one peruta, which is why the two acts of misuse combine.

§ The Gemara cites the opinions of other amora’im with regard to this matter. Similarly, like Rabbi Zeira, Reish Lakish says: Here, in his statement in the baraita above, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that knowledge of uncertain status prior to each possible transgression divides them into separate obligations to bring sin offerings for each one. And like Rava, Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees and says: Knowledge of uncertainty does not divide them into obligations to bring separate sin offerings.

Rather, this is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is teaching in the baraita: Just as if he had had definite knowledge prior to each instance of unwitting consumption he would bring a sin offering for each and every one, so too, if he had had knowledge of the uncertainty of each piece prior to his subsequent instance of unwitting consumption he would be obligated to bring a provisional guilt offering for each and every one. But knowledge of uncertainty prior to each instance of consumption does not render him obligated to bring multiple sin offerings if he later finds out they were all definitely prohibited.

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is why the baraita is formulated in a manner that indicates the halakha of a provisional guilt offering is dependent upon the halakhot governing the sin offering. Just as knowledge of an unwitting transgression renders one liable to bring a sin offering, so too, knowledge of uncertainty renders one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering. But according to Reish Lakish, the baraita should have taught that the halakha of a sin offering is dependent upon the knowledge of uncertainty necessary to render one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering, rather than the other way around. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is difficult.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan to another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and it likewise raises a contradiction from one statement of Reish Lakish to another statement of Reish Lakish. As it is taught in a baraita: There are two paths: one is ritually impure due to a corpse that is buried there and the other one is ritually pure, and it is unknown which path is which. If an individual walked on the first path and did not yet enter the Temple, and then he walked on the second path and afterward unwittingly entered the Temple, being that he certainly contracted ritual impurity after walking down both paths he is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity.

The baraita continues: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple he is exempt from bringing an offering. But if he then walked on the second path and afterward entered the Temple he is obligated to bring a sin offering, as he was definitely impure on one of the occasions that he entered the Temple. If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and subsequently went through the process of ritual purification, i.e., he received the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer on the third day and again on the seventh day, and immersed, and then walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering, as he definitely entered the Temple while ritually impure, either on the first occasion or on the second.